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PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND DEFICIT REDUCTION:
THE LANDSCAPE OF TAX POLICY IN THE 1980s AND
1990s
BERNARD M. SaAPiRo*
No major tax legislation enacted since 1980 has escaped the pull of
the often conflicting forces of White House politics and deficit reduction.
Tax legislation over the last dozen years largely has stemmed from either
Presidential political considerations or efforts to cut growing federal budget
shortfalls, or both. These often conflicting forces continue to guide tax
policy as the Clinton Administration and congressional tax-writers engage
in debate over a 1993 tax bill.
I. "REAGANOMICS": SUPPLY-SIDE EcONOMICS AND TAx-CUT BIDDING
In 1980, Ronald Reagan ran for president on the theme of reversing
the federal government's traditional reliance on "demand side" economics.
In times of economic downturn, the U.S. government typically has at-
tempted to spur economic activity by stimulating demand for goods and
services through tax cuts and spending programs. The side effect of this
fiscal stimulus had been too many dollars chasing too few goods, which
in turn produced inflation. Ronald Reagan's economic theme was to create
supply by encouraging investment.
In terms of tax policy, Reagan's supply-side economics promised tax
cuts both for individuals and business. Individuals under the Reagan plan
would receive a 30% tax cut, phased in over three years. As a result, the
Administration believed that individuals would save more money, which
in turn would spur investment and lead to robust economic growth.
Businesses, on the other hand, would be allowed to accelerate depreciation,
reducing the depreciable lives of assets from their longer "useful lives"
to shorter cost recovery periods.
Overall, the Reagan plan was projected to produce a balanced federal
budget in four years. At the time of Reagan's inauguration, the federal
budget deficit stood at about $75 billion. By 1984, however, the deficit
had swollen to about $185 billion. What went wrong?
In retrospect, the culprit appears to have been political posturing in
the aftermath of the Reagan election. The Republicans in 1980 gained a
majority in the Senate-for the first time in years-that was anxious to
exercise its new clout. Meanwhile, the Democrat-controlled House of
Representatives did not wish to be on the outside looking in as politically
popular tax cuts were being formulated.
* Partner, Director of Tax Policy, Price Waterhouse. B.A. 1964, Washington and Lee
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The Republican majority in the Senate wanted to be an active player
in the initial drafting of tax legislation, although the U.S. Constitution
requires all revenue-raising matters to originate in the House of Represen-
tatives.' Typically, the House Ways and Means Committee will hold
hearings, draft a tax bill, and then send the legislation before the full
House for consideration. The Senate Finance Committee-the counterpart
of Ways and Means-generally begins to act on the tax bill only after it
has cleared the House.
Senator Bob Dole (R-KA), the new chairman of the Finance Com-
mittee, decided that he did not want to be left considering a tax bill that
was the product of the Reagan Administration's negotiations with House
Democrats-a tax bill simply sent to the Senate for "rubberstamp" ap-
proval. As a result, the Finance Committee began moving on tax legislation
before the House could act on a bill.
At the time, two different versions of a tax bill were being contem-
plated in the House: a tax package drafted by the Democrats on the Ways
and Means Committee and an alternative put forward by a group of
conservative House Democrats. The conservative House Democrats ended
up working with House Republicans to try to defeat the bill that the
Democratic Ways and Means Committee members sent to the House floor.
In the end, a bidding war erupted over tax cuts-the heart of Reagan's
domestic campaign platform-as the Republican Senate, mainstream Dem-
ocrats in the House, and the conservative Democrats in the House offered
competing plans. When the frenzy was over, a tax bill with a revenue cost
of $750 billion over a five-year period became law.
2
Looking back, this was more than the federal government could afford.
Promised spending cuts to accompany the tax reductions never material-
ized, and the federal budget deficit grew unchecked.
Tax legislation in the following years was needed to "correct" the
imbalances of the '81 Act. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 19821 and the Deficit Reduction Act of 19844 were intended to take
back some of the 1981 tax cuts, while at the same time delivering on the
promise of spending cuts. Under an alleged "gentlemen's agreement"
reached in deliberations over the 1982 tax bill, for every dollar of tax
increases, spending would be reduced by three dollars. In the end, however,
that supposed agreement was not followed-the ratio of tax increases to
spending cuts was closer to one to one. The 1984 Act yielded similar
disappointing results.
1. U.S. CONST. I, § 7, cl. 1.
2. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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II. TAx REFORM AND THE RISE OF GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS
Ronald Reagan emerged from his landslide victory in the 1984 Presi-
dential election facing a deficit approaching $200 billion. In the campaign,
Democratic nominee Walter Mondale had attacked Reagan over his failure
to balance the budget, and the challenger pledged that he would support
tax increases if elected. Reagan took a different tack: he argued that the
tax Code instead needed "simplification" in the wake of the 1981, 1982,
and 1984 tax acts.
Reagan's campaign pledge manifested itself in Treasury IS and Treasury
116-proposals for tax reform that included large cuts in tax rates and a
broadening of the tax base. When the dust finally settled in the House
and Senate, we had the most comprehensive tax reform act in history.
7
In passing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress fine-tuned the
Reagan program to broaden the base and lower rates. The Act reduced
the top individual tax rate to 28%, cut the corporate income tax rate,
repealed the investment tax credit, eliminated beneficial tax treatment for
capital gains, and scrapped numerous tax shelters. Lost in the shuffle was
Reagan's campaign call for tax "simplification": a significant amount of
complexity was added to the tax Code as a result of the Act, and Congress
ultimately took "simplification" out of the original title.
Again, deficit reduction suffered. Not one dollar raised by TRA '86
was used to reduce the deficit. Congress instead shifted over $100 billion
of increases in business taxes to reduce taxes on individuals. Meanwhile,
during the consideration of the tax reform legislation, it became obvious
that Congress did not have the discipline to pass a significant spending
reduction bill.
To address these budget problems, Congress in 1985 enacted a new
budget enforcement program referred to as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 8
The legislation mandated reduction of the deficit-which in 1985 stood at
about $180 billion-over a five-year period. Deficit reduction of about
$36 billion a year beginning in 1987 would cut the budget shortfall to
zero by 1991, the drafters believed.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings directed Congress to cut the deficit through
"budget reconciliation" bills, which set specific targets for tax increases
and spending cuts necessary to meet annual deficit-reduction targets.
Reconciliation bills enacted in 1987, 9 1988,10 and 1989" provided the only
5. U.S. TREAsuRY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND EcoNoMIc GROWTH
194 (1984).
6. U.S. TREAsuRY DEP'T, TAX PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH &
SimpLicrIY 253-56 (1985).
7. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
8. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
9. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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"vehicle" for tax legislation during these years. Any tax cut initiatives
contemplated by the tax-writing committees had to be offset by additional
revenue increases above and beyond those they were required to produce
for deficit-reduction purposes.
III. "READ MY Lips" AND OBRA '90
By 1990, five years after the enactment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
and two years into the presidency of George Bush, the deficit stood at
$278 billion. What happened?
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings failed to reduce the deficit for a number of
reasons. First, in 1987, the stock market crashed, 2 and Congress scaled
back the deficit-reduction plan in an attempt to help protect the troubled
economy. Instead of cutting the deficit to zero in five years, the revised
plan was designed to balance the budget in seven years.
Furthermore, the deficit targets set by the plan proved overly opti-
mistic, especially in light of certain unforeseen events, such as the savings
and loan crisis, which drained billions of dollars out of the federal budget.
In addition, spending in federal "entitlement" programs-such as Medi-
care-outpaced estimates. Finally, Congress and the President failed to
enact any new significant reductions in "discretionary" federal spending
programs.
George Bush entered the White House having campaigned on two tax-
related planks. The first was his infamous statement, "Read my lips, no
new taxes,"' 13 which was later translated loosely by the Administration as
a pledge not to increase individual or corporate income tax rates. Second,
he pledged to cut the capital gains tax rate. Both promises led to trouble.
Congress and President Bush in 1990 agreed that the $64 billion deficit-
target set for the following year by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings could not
be met. They also agreed that a new budget mechanism and new specific
deficit-reduction options were needed, and that a bipartisan "summit"
was necessary to hammer out a plan.
Once the summit negotiations got underway in the summer of 1990,
it became clear that an agreement between Congressional Democrats and
the Administration would not be reached unless President Bush backed
off his "no new taxes" pledge. The %President ultimately agreed to put
taxes on the table over the objections of some of his political advisors.
In the end, a five-year, $500 billion deficit-reduction package-OBRA
'90-was fashioned, including an increase in the top individual income tax
10. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat.
3342 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
11. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 101-239, 103 U.S.C.).
12. Tim Metz et al., Stocks Plunge 508.43 Amid Panicky Selling, WAU ST. J., Oct. 20,
1987, at Al.
13. Tom Shales, Bush Bringing the Party to Life; From the New Nominee, A Splendid
Acceptance Speech, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 19, 1988, at Cl.
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rate to 31% and significant excise tax increases. Bush's attempt to include
a capital gains tax cut in the package was beaten back by Congressional
Democrats, who argued that the proposal would provide a boon to the
wealthy while causing a loss of federal revenues.
Bush therefore entered 1991 both having retreated on his "no new
taxes" pledge and having lost his bid to provide capital gains tax relief.
With the President licking his wounds and with the attention of the nation
focused on the Persian Gulf War, the tax-writing process was put on hold.
OBRA '90 allowed for this "moratorium" on tax legislation: the Act
removed the annual responsibility of the tax-writing committees to produce
tax increases aimed at deficit reduction through budget reconciliation
legislation. Instead, the tax increases included in the '90 Act itself, coupled
with the new "caps" on spending, were intended to cut the deficit
automatically over the following five years.
IV. 1992: "GRIDLOCK" THwARTs TAX LEGISLATION
Despite projected $300 billion budget shortfalls, attention in 1992
turned away from the deficit and toward the November Presidential
elections. The economic recession, though technically over, was at the
forefront of the Presidential campaign as consumer confidence plummeted.
Congressional Democrats attacked President Bush-still viewed favorably
by a majority of the public for his action in the Persian Gulf-over his
handling of the economy.
In response, President Bush in January unveiled an "economic stim-
ulus" program, including targeted tax incentives, such as an investment
tax allowance for businesses and enterprise zone tax incentives, designed
to spur economic growth. Bush called on Congress to pass his program
by March.
Congressional Democrats met this ambitious timetable, but turned the
effort into a political exercise. Added to the President's original proposals
were a proposed increase in the top individual income tax rate and a
millionaire's surtax-proposals clearly intended to draw a White House
veto. The Democrats knew that Bush would not sign the bill (H.R. 4210)
in fear of again violating his "no new taxes" pledge, and that the President
could then be criticized as having failed to act on the economy. Bush did
veto the legislation, and cries of "gridlock" began to be raised on Capitol
Hill.
Lawmakers tried again later in the year as the economy continued to
sputter. Congressional Democrats drafted a tax bill (H.R. 11) over the
summer and fall that included many of the economic stimulus proposals
originally offered by President Bush and left out many of the more
significant tax increases that drew the White House veto of H.R. 11 earlier
in the year.
In order to comply with the OBRA '90 pay-as-you-go budget rules,
however, the bill had to be revenue-neutral. In other words, the cost of
the tax incentives in the bill had to be offset by a corresponding or larger
amount of revenue raisers. Congress proposed $28 billion in relatively
1993]
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noncontroversial tax increases that attempted to "tweak" revenues from
the tax Code, including various "loophole" closers. In all, H.R. 11 would
have raised $28 billion in revenues over five years to offset the cost of
the tax incentives.
The bill was sent to the White House shortly before the November
election, but was ultimately vetoed. During the campaign, President Bush
had attempted to paint Democratic challenger Bill Clinton as a "tax and
spend" Democrat who had signed scores of tax increases into law during
his tenure as governor of Arkansas; many of these amounted to no more
than user fees and other relatively insignificant revenue raisers. As a result,
Bush was reluctant to sign legislation that included numerous revenue
raisers that similarly might be called "tax increases."
V. THE CLINTON PROGRAM: CAMPAIGN PLEDGES, POLITICAL REALITIES
President Bill Clinton assumed office in 1993 armed with four overall
domestic policy goals, each of which has tax policy implications and each
of which has been modified in light of economic and budget realities.
First, President Clinton pledged to stimulate the .economy and provide
for long-term economic growth through targeted new federal spending and
tax incentives for businesses, including an investment tax credit.
Before Congress could implement any of Clinton's proposals, however,
there was good news on the economic front that reduced the need for
action in the eyes of some. The rate of growth in the gross domestic
product was 3.4% for the third quarter of 1992 and 4.7% for the fourth
quarter-significantly higher than had been anticipated. Senate Republi-
cans, led by Bob Dole, successfully filibustered Clinton's "stimulus"
spending package, and the House Ways and Means Committee scuttled
the Administration's proposed investment tax credit.
Second, Clinton as a candidate proposed to cut the deficit in half by
1997. The caps on spending imposed by OBRA '90 had not reduced overall
spending, as lawmakers in 1990 had hoped, and the deficit in 1992 stood
at $290 billion. To meet his deficit reduction target, Clinton during the
campaign proposed new spending cuts as well as a package of tax increases,
including a top individual income tax rate increase and $45 billion in
increased taxes on foreign corporations operating in the United States.
After entering the White House, however, President Clinton found
that the deficit reduction measures advanced in the campaign would leave
him short of his overall deficit-reduction goal. The new Administration
claimed that new budget projections showed the deficit to be much higher
than his campaign team had assumed. The Administration also found that
some of the deficit-reduction measures it had counted on during the
campaign were not in fact workable. For example, the Administration was
unable to craft a proposal that would raise anywhere near the $45 billion
from foreign corporations that it had promised. As a result, Clinton was
forced to look to additional measures, including a new tax on energy
consumption, in order to help meet his deficit reduction goals.
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A third Clinton campaign goal was to restore "tax fairness"-Clinton
argued that tax Code changes in the 1980s disproportionately benefitted
the wealthy. Clinton proposed to raise taxes on higher-income taxpayers
and cut the taxes of middle-income families.
The Administration, in its fiscal 1994 budget submission, did follow
through on its promise of higher taxes on the wealthy, including proposed
new top income rates of 36% and 39.6%. In light of the size of the
federal budget deficit, however, the Administration backed away from the
promised middle-class tax relief.
Fourth, Clinton during the campaign proposed to overhaul the nation's
health care system and extend health coverage to the estimated 37 million
uninsured individuals. Clinton as a candidate argued that cost-cutting
measures that would accompany health care reform would finance an
overall package.
After entering the White House, however, President Clinton indicated
that while reform ultimately would cut overall U.S. spending on health
care, new revenues would have to be found to offset the program's cost
in the early years. Financing options initially discussed by some in the
Clinton Administration included a value-added tax (VAT), which, if en-
acted, would represent the biggest change to the U.S. tax Code since 1986.
The Administration more recently has discussed the possibility of a new
payroll tax on employers, among other options.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1980, no action on major tax legislation has taken place outside
the context of presidential politics and deficit-reduction efforts. It remains
to be seen how the Democratic Congress and President Clinton follow
through on reducing the deficit and overhauling the health care system.
It seems clear, however, that the tax Code will continue to serve as a tool
as Democrats and Republicans alike seek to build a record that will
translate into success for their parties in the 1994 and 1996 elections.
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